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Poorly implemented foreign aid is actually bad for 
Ukraine. When carrying out numerous foreign aid 
projects and programs replaces the work of real re-
forms, the effect is a mere imitation of active reform 
work and the results just pie in the sky.
So far, foreign assistance has not helped Ukraine 
set up a system of transformation knowledge man-
agement because it failed to 
shape a critical mass of knowl-
edge and skills, it neglected 
to set up institutions to man-
age foreign assistance and ensure a breakthrough 
and systemic reforms, and it thus failed to catalyze 
systemic reform in Ukraine.
The European Union began to propose sectoral 
budget support to Ukraine back in 2007 and the first 
agreement was signed in September 2008. Accord-
ing to the European Commission’s formulation from 
2007, “…an important change in the modality of aid 
occurred in Ukraine, that is, a shift in the direction of 
Sectoral Budget Support (SBS) to strengthen politi-
cal dialog and increase the role of the government 
in this process. SBS programs are determined on the 
basis of a Sector Readiness Assessment that, in turn, 
is based on seven criteria, three of which are quali-
fication criteria: a strategy in the sector, a suitable 
macroeconomic environment, and an independent 
system for managing public finances. If one or more 
criteria are not fulfilled, the conditions for preparing 
an SBS are considered not satisfied.”1
The EU has a well-established practice of providing 
budget support to partner countries, especially in 
Africa. The decision to use this budget support in-
1 Outline of EC Concept on “Potential priority zones 
for national ENPI indicative programs in Ukraine,” 
2011–201, p. 14.
strument with Ukraine is a kind of political signal in-
dicating that the EU wishes to trust our country and 
support its reform processes. In an absolute sense, 
the amount of budget support allocated to Ukraine 
is modest. At the same time, the format of budget 
support adds an element of conditionality to this 
assistance, requiring the fulfillment of criteria even 
before money is handed out for budget support.
Budget Support – putting concepts to work
Budget Support (BS) is the primary type of fi nancial as-
sistance provided through the European Neighborhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).  It is defi ned thus: 
“...the transferring of funds by the agency that is pro-
viding external fi nancing to the partner country’s 
Treasury is on condition that the latter upholds the 
agreed terms of payment. Funding received in this 
manner is part of the overall resources of the part-
ner country, which should be used in accordance 
with the public fi nance management system of the 
partner country.”2
Budget support can be either general or sector-spe-
cifi c:
General Budget Support (GBS) involves transfer-
ring money for the execution of national devel-
opment or strategic reform plans.
Sectoral budget support (SBS) involved transfer-
ring money for the execution of programs aimed 
at the development of specifi c economic sectors.
Budget Support consists of a series of payments or 
tranches. The European Commission transfers the fi rst 
or “fi xed” tranche on condition that national executive 
bodies have met specifi c requirements in the prelimi-
nary assessment, while the receipt of subsequent or 
“ﬂ exible” tranches depends on meeting certain bench-
marks set within the support program.
2 OECD/DAC, Harmonizing donor practice to provide 
more effective assistance, Vol. 2, 2006 р.
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Budget Support, which makes up 70% of the nation-
al component of the ENPI in Ukraine for the period 
2007 through 2009, arises from the need to support 
national development priorities in the partner coun-
try. And indeed, the European Consensus on Devel-
opment specifies that: “The European Commission 
now has a more clearly defined coordinating and 
channeling role on behalf of the EU and its member 
states. Assistance may be given using any number 
of instruments, that is from technical assistance to 
general and sectoral budget support. The EU ex-
pects the overall amount of budget support to third 
countries to expand up to 50% in 2010.”
How Budget Support started in Ukraine
The story actually begins in 2005, when Ukraine 
and the European Union signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the energy 
sector on 1 December. In March 2006, the Govern-
ment of Ukraine adopted the Energy Strategy of 
Ukraine through 200.
After the preliminary assessment, an Agreement on 
Funding the EU External Assistance Program called 
“Support to Institute Ukraine’s Energy Strategy” 
was signed on 17 March 2008. The preliminary as-
sessment involved these seven criteria, the first 
three being the key ones:
strategy/sectoral development program;
macroeconomic situation;
system for managing public finances; 
budget and medium-term expenditure frame-
work;
coordination of donor assistance; 
performance assessment;
institutional assessment and capacity-building.
The European Commission did not publish the re-
sults of its preliminary assessment prior to deciding 
 The European Consensus (2006/C 46/01), a joint 
statement by the Council and representatives of mem-
ber-country governments on the Council, of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the EC regarding the political 
future of the European Union.
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to allocate funding for budget support purposes. 
But discussions with experts in launching Budget 
Support programs made it clear that Ukraine failed 
to meet two of the three main criteria!
The quality of the energy sector strategy underwent 
a severe critique by experts. Among others, Serhiy 
Yermilov, director of the Institute for Environmental 
Issues and Energy Conservation, noted violations of 
the principle of comprehensiveness in the develop-
ment of Ukraine’s Energy Strategy.4
The macroeconomic situation deteriorated in 2008 
because of the global financial crisis and panic on 
financial markets, a deterio-
rating hryvnia exchange rate, 
defaults in the banking sys-
tem, and hold-ups in wages 
and salaries.
Ukraine’s system of managing 
public finances, according to 
a SIGMA assessment,5 was not 
in line with international standards and remains so 
to this day. The process of harmonizing Ukraine’s 
system with international norms is currently under-
way with the support of several international techni-
cal assistance programs.6
Yet Ukraine’s failure to meet the criteria did not stop 
the EC from transferring the first tranche of EUR 
2mn in December 2008, as the first part of its SBS 
allocation of EUR 82mn to support he country’s en-
ergy strategy. However, no further money has been 
disbursed.
4 http://www.dt.ua/2000/2200/5482/
5 Support for Improvement in Governance and Manage-
ment (SIGMA). Source: http://www.oecd.org/datao-
ecd/4/58/829242.pdf
6 1) Assistance to the Main Oversight Administration of 
Ukraine in instituting a new system of internal financial 
control (Twinning Program), 18.09.2007–17.12.2009; 
donor: EU Commission.
 2) Project to modernize public finance, 2008–201, as 
part of a loan from the IBRD (World Bank).
The EC released funding 
for the energy sector 
despite Ukraine’s clear 
lack of capacity to use 
this money effectively
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Sore points in the implementation 
process
In addition to the fact that the basic criteria hadn’t 
been met, a number of other problem areas were 
also uncovered:
Procedure for disbursing funds: This is done follow-
ing the rules and procedures of the recipient coun-
try, which are currently missing in Ukraine. The 
Ministry of Finance has just begun to work these up 
in partnership with the Ministry of Economy. So far, 
the money from the first BS program has not been 
used.
Awareness among officials: Because governmental 
civil servants are ignorant of the opportunities of-
fered by the BS program, they are unable to carry it 
out effectively.
Monitoring and evaluation: Although responsibil-
ity for managing funds lies with the recipient coun-
try’s government, there is no working mechanism 
on the Ukrainian side for monitoring and evaluating 
the progress of the BS program.
Formally, control over the execution of the program 
is the responsibility of a specially-formed Joint 
Monitoring Group (JMG). Although this group is 
required to meet every two months, so far it has met 
only twice: 8 September 2009 and 15 February 2010. 
Importantly, the JMG includes both Ukrainian offi-
cials and representatives of the EC, but there is no 
provision for representatives of the NGO sector to 
be involved at all.
Gap between EU requirements and the powers of in-
dividual ministers: Not all benchmarks for success-
ful execution of the BS program fall within the com-
petence of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, such as 
the requirement to present and enact the Law “On 
state procurements” in line with EU norms.
The first BS program for Ukraine is a test for the Eu-
ropean Commission as an ef-
fective donor and for the Gov-
ernment of Ukraine as a reli-
able partner in terms of com-
mitments taken on. Should 
the program fail to be carried 
out properly, future BS programs that are currently 
in the planning stage are likely to be postponed.
EU Sectoral Budget Support 
for Ukraine 2008–2009
At this time, the EU and Ukraine are preparing to launch 
two BS programs:
Developing trade and commerce (norms and stan-
dards). EU support: EUR 45mn (Budget Support EUR 
39mn, Technical Assistance EUR 6mn)
Increasing energy efficiency. EU support: Budget 
Support EUR 70mn (Budget Support EUR 63mn, 
Technical Assistance EUR 7mn)
The European Commission also gave preliminary ap-
proval for joint financing of two more sectoral programs 
in 2009*:
Developing the transport sector. Planned EU sup-
port: EUR 40mn (Budget Support EUR 35mn, Tech-
nical Assistance EUR 5mn)
Environmental protection. Planned EU support: EUR 
77mn (Budget Support EUR 72mn, Technical Assis-
tance EUR 5mn)
* Funds are disbursed in the year following the 
planning year.
The value of the BS instrument depends entirely on 
the readiness of the Government in the partner coun-
try to effectively manage this resource. Ukraine’s 
unreformed government machine ipso facto is inca-
pable of carrying out strategies that are being drawn 
up in order to get funding rather than as a guideline 
to the actual execution.
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of the first BS program: 
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Yet responsibility for the ineffectiveness of aid can-
not be placed entirely at the feet of the Ukrainian 
side. Aid is a two-way street.
At the point where the recipient country is assessed 
according to EC criteria, an effective trap is set. Any 
compromise on the results of the assessment indi-
cates just one thing: support for the unreformed 
state of Ukraine today and the interest of European 
countries to any way issue funds in direct violation 
to their own requirements.
What next?
First of all, an honest and thorough assessment of 
the scale of unreformed government institutions in 
Ukraine by representatives of the European Com-
mission is needed. The EC has not been willing to 
acknowledge how unready Ukraine is for assistance 
such as Budget Support. Yet to propose a policy-
driven assistance to a country whose state institu-
tions are opaque and unreformed is the same as 
building a castle on sand. As long as the ineffec-
tive and corrupt system of public administration in 
Ukraine remains in place, no systemic reforms will 
be possible.
Secondly, the nature of as-
sistance should not be based 
on condescension and com-
promise but on strictness and 
conditionality, The EU knows 
how to reform countries as 
it succeeded in bringing the 
government institutions of 
countries that joined the Eu-
ropean family in the last six 
years up to standard.
Only after a major reconstruction of the foundation 
and roof will it be possible to consider cosmetic im-
provements in Ukraine. This means the most impor-
tant step right now is to direct foreign aid resources 
towards democratizing the public administration 
system in Ukraine and bringing it in line with EU 
standards.
Right now, Ukraine and 
the EU need to direct aid 
at democratizing the 
system of government 
in Ukraine
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